ROMANIA
The Romanian Intelligence Service

REPORT

On the Activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service in 2012

The Service above us and the country above all
www.sri.ro

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER V
COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF SRI'S ACTIVITIES
V.1. Strategic coordination of the activities by the Supreme Council for National Defense
V.2. Democratic control
  V.2.1. Parliamentary oversight
  V.2.2. Legal control
  V.2.3. Financial control

CHAPTER VI
COOPERATION WITH THE CIVIL SOCIETY
VI.1. Relations with the civil society and the security education
VI.2. Relations with the public and mass-media
VI.3. Transfer of the Securitate files

CHAPTER VII
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
VII.1. Human resources management
  VII.1.1. Human resources parameters
  VII.1.2. Professional training
VII.2. The management of financial and logistic resources

CHAPTER VIII
2013 PRIORITIES
VIII.1. Overview
VIII.2. Objectives and guidelines for 2013

CHAPTER I
RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 2012

In 2012, SRI made consistent efforts in order to manage a complex and dynamic operational situation, adjusting its specific actions to prevent and counter the risks and threats to national security.

In the context of instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East, one of the most relevant developments in terms of security was represented by an **increase in terrorist risks**, meaning that the threat to Romania turned into a direct one, though in the absence of an imminent terrorist attack. The transformation of our country from a generic target into an **explicit target** was evidenced by both the Burgas attack and the statements of the jihadist ideologist Omar Bakri (who indicated our country as a potential target).

The strategic commitments that outline Romania's Euro-Atlantic profile – its involvement in the fight against global terrorism, its military participation in various conflict areas/theatre of operations – play a part in maintaining our country under the scrutiny of terrorist entities, and require that preventive measures be taken accordingly.

Additional focus on security was entailed by an **increase in illegal migration flows** originating in areas affected by instability (MENA, Afghanistan-Pakistan) and by the upward trend of Islamic propaganda (the Internet remaining the main tool for the dissemination of Islamic messages).

These developments are compounded by the persistence of certain domestic vulnerabilities in terms of regulations, procedures or even determined by eluding certain legal provisions (some of these are present in other EU countries as well). More precisely, this category encompasses deficiencies in the video monitoring of public locations and other public interest facilities that might be targeted by terrorist attacks, and non-compliance with tourist registration regulations.

Under these circumstances, it was possible to keep the terror alert level - *Cautious – Blue* due to the **preventive measures** taken in the case of individuals suspected of terrorist intentions or activities (declaring them as undesirable, not allowing them to enter the country, determining them to renounce to their plans, etc.), and to domestic (within SNPCT - the National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism) and foreign cooperation.

Considering that the cyberspace has become the scene of a new type of war involving traditional state actors as well as non-state ones, the **cybernetic threat** is of increased concern.

The cybernetic attacks aimed at domestic institutions with responsibilities in the field of foreign policy and national security (annihilated with the help of SRI) attest to the fact that **Romania is a target for hostile entities acting in cyberspace** and interested in gaining access to IT systems of national interest and collecting information.

In 2012, the *Red October* cybernetic attack, cybernetic espionage, IT organized crime activities were highly aggressive and, secondarily, hacktivism. The Service was involved in countering them by means of providing technical expertise to targeted public

institutions, and through its cooperation with prosecution bodies and with foreign partners, as the case may be.

This type of attacks are compounded by the insufficient cybernetic security of the IT systems managed by domestic operators, especially in the context of a significant development of the ITC systems and of an increased use of ITC technology in Romania (for example, the implementation of IT systems in the health sector). Moreover, the recent multiplication of databases managed by national institutions and authorities, and especially their prospective interconnection requires a coordinated and coherent approach in implementing both major projects designed to create the **information society** and **cybernetic security** ones (the vulnerabilities in one respect extending to the system). Additionally, the competition from the private sector causes the migration of specialized human resources from state entities (mainly because of low wages), and filling those vacant positions is difficult to achieve given the restrictions in respect of public sector employment. Hardware and software obsolescence as against the rapid development of new technologies also affects the capacity to ensure IT security.

An activity that continued to be identified in this period was **espionage**, carried on through classical means by intelligence structures from various states, subsumed under the foreign policy actions promoted by the states of origin and related to major regional/international developments. The status of NATO and EU member state, Romania's participation in Euro-Atlantic decision-making processes and mechanisms, in setting up the US anti-missile shield (by hosting on the national territory some of its components) and the presence of US military facilities on the national territory place our country under the scrutiny of players with divergent interests.

In relation to these activities, the deficiencies **in terms of the protection of classified information** by the entities possessing them continue to be a domestic vulnerability.

As an EU border state, Romania has been targeted by **cross-border organized crime networks** specialized in smuggling (excisable goods, counterfeit goods, cigarettes), various typed of trafficking (drugs, weapons) or illegal migration (there is a growing migration pressure at non-EU borders against the background of continuing tensions in MENA). Domestic criminal groups continued to act mainly in European countries, but extended their operations to Canada and the US as well (in addition to cybercrime, illegal migration and human trafficking activities have also been identified and brought to the attention of judicial bodies). These have substantial negative consequences on Romania's international image as well, impacting on the freedom of movement of Romanian citizens to the US.

On the other hand, the tendency to use violence, including military force, by certain **organized crime groups**, coupled with consistent efforts to protect their own fields of action has been reconfirmed.

In terms of **weapons of mass destruction and conventional armament counter-proliferation**, the main risks and threats to Romania's national security stemmed from the arming programs of certain states subject to international embargoes, and the turbulence in the Middle East security environment. An important role that fell upon the Service, in cooperation with the relevant authorities, was to avoid the breach of the sanctions imposed on proliferating states, especially in the context in which Constanța port is among the routes targeted by the exponents of those interests.

Although on a downward trend as compared with the previous interval, the **black market** remained substantial despite the measures taken to counter tax evasion, including inter-institutional arrangements. The main fields where represented by: food, energy, constructions, alcohol and related products, tourism, transportation, wood, labor („black" or „grey").

Significant losses to the state budget have been caused by intra-community transactions, "shuttle" operations or "carousel" fraud, as well as by the involvement of dummy corporations on the tax evasion circuit or unjustified requests for VAT refunds.

The entities involved in tax evasion were constantly supported by representatives of the bodies that perform controls and impose sanctions, significant pressures being made in order to subordinate employees in institutions with border security responsibilities.

Although it is a great opportunity to counter the effects of the economic crisis, the **absorption of EU funds remained inadequate** and, as a consequence, development gaps as compared with the EU continue to exist especially as the European Commission is more and more consistent in applying financial corrections.   Against this background, foreign investments were low, and the economic growth resumed slowly, so that the negative effects of the crisis, including the social ones, continued to be present.

The impoverishment of citizens in the context of prolonged economic and financial difficulties is a premise for the manifestation of social tensions having economic roots, and also for the **propagation of extremist ideologies**. The risk that legitimate protests might be diverted by the exponents of extremist movements and/or that they might degenerate into violence requires the cooperation of national structures with public order and security responsibilities. While up to now no large-scale extremist actions have been organized, the actions carried out by similar foreign organizations represent an inspiration to domestic followers, having the potential to significantly influence the level of activism and the manner of public expression, eroding the credibility of domestic authorities and of their public interest actions.

A particular form of extremism, the **ethnic** one, is represented by the activities performed by the offshoots of Hungarian revisionist structures in our country.

A factor with a significant contribution to the persistence of social and economic difficulties has been the **large-scale corruption** in public institutions, illegitimate interests groups acting so as to divert in their own interest the decision-making process in various fields (mainly public administration – preferential allocation of funds, discretionary awarding of public procurement contracts, etc.), and the administration of justice.

Non-compliance with the legal framework on transparency while holding public positions, and the cases of incompatibility or conflict of interest have been a constant of the period, public interest being thus seriously affected.

Such situations have also affected the citizens' constitutional rights to education and healthcare, in addition to chronic underfunding, inadequate management (in many cases taking the form of unwise management of available resources) and human resources deficiencies (inadequate training, lack of qualified personnel).

The dynamics of the risks and threats to national security require a permanent adjustment of the Service's specific missions – from prevention to countering – and the flexible configuration of its capabilities with a view to fulfilling the institution's legal responsibilities, especially through the management of human resources, but also subject to meeting the material and financial needs at a satisfactory level at a minimum.

CHAPTER II
THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE ACTIVITIES PERFORMED IN 2012

In order to continue the steps taken during the previous year to implement **The Strategic Vision for 2011-2015 "SRI in the Age of Information"**, 2012 witnessed a stage of the new strategic cycle, the main efforts being focused on:
- maintaining the operational performance parameters – even with limited resources, by using the institutional planning system which allowed for adjustments and reallocations according to priorities
- strengthening inter-institutional cooperation, including in respect of operative activities;
- extending bilateral and multilateral international cooperation, with direct advantages in terms of strengthening the Service's profile within the European and Euro-Atlantic intelligence community, as well as for the proper representation of Romania's interests;
- implementing the new human resources management system;
- developing relations with the civil society and the academia as part of the Service's objective to promote the culture of security and strengthen the communication with the public.

Among the **significant developments** in 2012, the following should be emphasized:

➢ from an **institutional** perspective
- preserving the status of **pivotal institution in the field of national security**, by **accurately adjusting its activities** according to the multiple developments in the security context, and as a result there were no strategic surprises that the Service could not handle;
- **strengthening the capacity to coordinate the Service's policies and strategies**, including by way of specific implementation/operationalization plans and mechanisms for making efficient use of "lessons learned" and disseminating "best practices";
- taking further **steps to increase flexibility and reduce bureaucracy by way of new norms or procedures,** relevant especially for operational activities;
- **designing, testing and completing tools for the analysis and assessment of security risks, with a view to prioritizing operational efforts** and the allocation of resources;

➢ from an **operational** perspective
- **maintaining high operational performance parameters** despite limited resources (by using the institutional planning system which allowed for adjustments and reallocations according to priorities);
- continuing the **structural and functional assessment and organizational reconfiguration** process so as to achieve an optimal management of resources in accordance with the magnitude of the threats to national security;

- using **unitary approaches within the territorial structures** and improving their correlation with the priorities set by central units, simultaneously with a **higher degree of flexibility of local actions**;
- initiating new measures to **increase the efficiency of the activities that use covert human sources** and using their potential to provide intelligence and their mobility in complex operations;
- **developing** the traditional **operational partnerships** and establishing new ones;
- performing specific activities meant to **investigate and counter cybernetic attacks;**
- **strengthening SRI's role of national authority for the prevention and countering of terrorism**, as evidenced by the achievement of significant results, and ensuring coherent relations with SNPCT players and foreign partners;

➢ in terms of **analysis and briefing**
- **improving the quality, substance and complexity of the reports submitted to legal beneficiaries;**
- **ensuring a better adjustment to the information needs of decision-makers** (emphasizing the anticipatory and preventive nature of the reports), as evidenced by having twice as many responses and subsequent measures taken at the central level, concurrently with correlating the briefing process with the institutional changes, which made possible the avoidance of strategic surprises;
- **increasing the cooperation between the analysis and operational structures,** including by setting up joint teams and actively participating in working groups within the Service on various regions or topics in order to make better use of the fund of information and guide the operative structures in accordance with the beneficiaries' needs;
- **increasing the operational analysis capability,** by generating timely and high-quality information products;
- **enhancing the involvement of territorial structures in the information analysis process,** through a **diversification of the topics** (covering various lines of work) **and of the types of reports** submitted to local beneficiaries;
- **regulating and developing the OSINT activity,** by surveying a considerable **volume of virtual sources** and ensuring the **early alert** function (including for beneficiaries outside the Service);
- **giving an impetus to bilateral and multilateral external cooperation in the field of analysis.**

➢ from a **technical** perspective
- **implementing new technologies in day to day activities** in order to improve performance along the components of the intelligence cycle, coupled with **ensuring adequate security policies**;

- **continuing to implement the Strategic Vision 'SRI in the Age of Information",** by developing new IT systems for intelligence and resource management activities, as well as by adapting the existing ones to operational requirements and current needs;
- **making intra-institutional flows more efficient and extending the use of IT in internal management processes,** with a view to achieving rapid data and information exchanges and performing the electronic management of documents;
- **ensuring the management of Romania's Integrated IT System –** in its capacity as national authority in this field;
- special efforts have been made within the **CYBERINT National Center** to **improve the technical capabilities and professional competences for assessing the security of IT systems, malware analysis** and the development of specific applications;
- developing hardware or software products to **protect electronic information through cryptographic methods;**

➢ in terms of **cooperation**
  a) at the national level:
  - **increasing cooperation within the national security system**, the Service making a substantial contribution in the formats meant to prevent and counter large-scale tax evasion;
  - **strengthening cooperation with prosecution bodies** by significantly increasing the number of briefings/notifications sent to them and implementing the necessary measures in order to document criminal activities that might generate risks/threats to national security;
  - **improving cooperation** in the management of European affairs in terms of security, as well as in reaching an agreement on the national position in the NATO format;

  b) at the international level
  - **maintaining a high degree of cooperation with strategic partners,** giving an impetus to the cooperation with services in neighboring countries and the extended Black Sea region, and extending the cooperation with services in other regions of strategic interest to Romania;
  - **significantly increasing** the number of messages exchanged with partner services, including as a result of SRI's membership of European multilateral cooperation formats;
  - **organizing high-standard multilateral activities on topical issues for the European intelligence community;**

➢ in terms of **human resources management**
  - **successfully implementing the new human resources policies** (filling positions in a competitive manner, job rotation, implementation of mentoring and career counseling activities, using effective criteria for

acknowledging and rewarding performance, for motivating and encouraging a career within the Service);

- **reshaping the education activities within SRI,** in accordance with the needs and requirements of beneficiaries, and the integration of **IT platforms** in the education process;

- **initiating a pilot program for enhancing the cognitive skills of analysts/future analysts** at "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy;

➢ in terms of **promoting the security culture, actions have been taken to improve the dialog with the decision-makers entitled to receive briefings from SRI** (present and potential beneficiaries); to this end, *Guidelines for Beneficiaries* have been drawn up and made available to them.

At the same time, **the partnership with the University of Bucharest has been strengthened** by implementing a new format for the Security Studies – Information Analysis Master's program of the Department of Sociology and Social Work.

With a view to developing the security culture, the Service continued to issue specialized publications valued by the academia and decision-makers alike.

➢ in terms of **public communication,** a campaign to promote the image of the institution has been launched; within this campaign, the Service configured **new visual identity elements** (designed to adequately reflect the values promoted by SRI), reconstructed its **website**, drew up documents meant to improve its interactions with decision-makers and citizens, and marked important moments for the institution (SRI's Day, the Antiterrorist Fighter's Day).

CHAPTER III
PARAMETERS OF THE ACTIVITIES PERFORMED

III.1. Intelligence activities
In 2012, the Service acted to maintain high performance parameters, with a focus on:
- ➢ adapting its capabilities to the dynamics of the operational situation and anticipating developments with a potential impact on national security;
- ➢ planning and assessing the way in which objectives are met, including in terms of an efficient use of resources, in an integrated manner;
- ➢ increasing the degree of flexibility and the capability to manage specific activities, according to priorities and to the characteristics of the relevant operational situation;
- ➢ facilitating the access to information resources and developing the operational analysis capability, so that it was possible to make better use of the information gathered;
- ➢ enhancing management effectiveness through the emphasis placed on the qualitative dimension of activities, and the increased attention paid to coordination and control;
- ➢ enhancing cooperation activities by means of reinforcing teamwork within the institution, strengthening cooperation among institutions (mainly with regard to the prevention and countering of tax evasion) and enhancing international cooperation both at bilateral and at multilateral level.

Continuing the previous years' trend (i.e. the level of operational performance achieved in 2010 or the 2011 performance in terms of cooperation and partnership), **2012** was characterized by the **reassertion of values**.
The high level of operational achievements was maintained due to the strengthening of the Service's intelligence and analytical capacities, to the enhancement of a number of preventive measures (mainly for the prevention and countering of terrorism or of cyber threats), to the development and reinforcement of the cooperation with other organizations dealing with threats and risks to national security, as well as to the intensification of international cooperation activities, both at operational and at analytical level.

A number of operational achievements spanning across the entire range of activities can be highlighted in this context:
- ➢ *identification*
  - corruption acts that are likely to affect the decision-making process and therefore can be detrimental to national security;
  - vast international arms trafficking networks (with ramifications in many other states);

- ➢ *prevention*
  - adoption of a significant number of specific measures;

- investigation, identification and communication of the relevant information based on which the judicial bodies can declare certain foreigners as "undesirable citizens" or ban others from entering the country;

➢ *termination*
- the export of weapons to proliferating states;
- operations by means of which classified documents regarding the copper reserves in certain mining areas of Romania are taken out of the country;
- cross border organized crime networks (bank frauds, money laundering, illegal migration);

➢ *dismantling*
- criminal groups involved in large-scale tax evasion activities;
- illegal migration networks or groups involved in the smuggling of cigarettes or oil products;
- an important drug trafficking network with connections in Turkey;

➢ *notification of the competent bodies, followed by the adoption of detention /arrest measures*
- decision-makers supporting criminal activities;
- members and coordinators of high-risk drug trafficking networks;
- members and coordinators of networks specialized in cybercrime activities, i.e. illegal access to IT systems, theft of classified, confidential or private data, the disabling of the targeted systems and unlawful interception of electronic communications;

➢ *cyber protection*
- investigation and countering of cyber-attacks directed against Romanian public institutions.

With regard to the **dynamics of intelligence activities,** SRI has constantly focused on the efficient use of the available information resources and on the identification of the optimal reactions to the threats within the Service's jurisdiction.
The primary goal of our organization consists in efficiently using all the identified aspects in order to:
➢ **notify the lawful beneficiaries** – by being more attuned to their information needs and by identifying new beneficiaries in specialized areas of expertise;

➢ **support the activity of criminal investigation and prosecution bodies**, by providing information mainly regarding large-scale organized crime, informal economy and corruption, which have an adverse impact on general welfare or the citizens' security.

The Service's focus on priorities in the last years has resulted in a decreasing number of operational activities, while the number of **complex operations has increased by**

13% compared to the year 2011. Such operations culminated in the identification, prevention and countering of a number of risks and threats to national security.

In 2012 the Service's specific activity was centered on the following **operational priorities**:

➢ **economic security:**
- risks to social and economic stability, to regional development and to the modernization of public institutions, as well as to the convergence with certain EU objectives;
- ensuring energetic security (access to resources and to the alternative transportation corridors, pricing conditions, sustainable and secure development of the nuclear component within the national energetic system, renewable energy systems);
- vulnerabilities affecting the proper functioning of critical infrastructure and relevant development policies;
- large-scale tax evasion and fraud, as well as customs fraud;
- potential risks to the quality of environmental factors and to the achievement of relevant European standards;

➢ **protection of public order and constitutional values:**
- actions that are likely to have an impact on constitutional values or on the citizens' rights and liberties;
- administrative flaws, irregularities within the judicial system prone to have a negative impact on national security, as well as high-level corruption acts;
- systemic dysfunctions in terms of the provision of vital services to the public, mainly in the field of health and education, as well as regarding the proper functioning of the social security system;

➢ **counterespionage:**
- activities carried out by foreign intelligence services from countries with divergent or conflicting interests with respect to our national interest;

➢ **cross border threats:**
- cross border risks, mainly the activities of organized crime networks, smuggling, illegal migration, drug trafficking, cybercrime, proliferation of CBRN weapons, clandestine programs for the provision of conventional or mass destruction weapons and carrier vectors;

➢ **cyber intelligence:**
- cyber-attacks against national IT&C infrastructures;

➢ **prevention and countering of terrorism:**
- terrorist risks generated by the presence in Romania of extremist groups or individuals and amplified by the ongoing developments in countries where the terrorist threat is tangible;

From the point of view of specific threats to national security, **economic matters** were still placed at the top of the Service's agenda in 2012, due to the lingering effects of the economic crisis and to the need to promote national interests in certain areas of expertise. At the same time, given the dynamics of the security environment, there has been an increase in the number of information related to cyber threats, the prevention and countering of terrorism, cross border organized crime and counterespionage.

The distribution of the information gathered by the Service – with regards to specific national security threats – had the following structure:

- economic security – **27.34%**;
- protection of public order and constitutional values – **24.81%**;
- cross border threats – **17.25%**;
- counterespionage and promotion of certain security interests – **13.40%**;
- prevention and countering of terrorism – **11.26%**;
- protection of classified information – **3.25%**;
- risks and threats to IT&C – **2.69%**.

III.2. The Efficient Use of Intelligence

III.2.1. Notification of the decision-makers

During the specified period, SRI's reports submitted to the decision-makers were aimed at providing an accurate and comprehensive view of a complex and dynamic environment.

The relevance and timeliness of such information – as the feedback received by the Service clearly demonstrates – facilitated the decision-making process.

In 2012 one of the Service's main concerns was managing the dissemination of information given the numerous changes in the government, so as to avoid any drawbacks in terms of ensuring a proper understanding of relevant developments.

The activities carried out along these lines had in view:

- **the priorities established in accordance with the social and economic agenda and with the main concerns in terms of foreign policy** (based on the Intelligence Assessment and the Intelligence Priorities National Plan);
- **the lawful beneficiaries' competences and information needs** (directly stated or derived from strategic orientation documents /statements).

This approach enabled the implementation of timely actions and therefore the gathering and dissemination of useful information to support the decision-making process.

From the viewpoint of the **quality of the reports submitted to the Service's lawful beneficiaries** the main objectives were:

- **to enhance the relevance, usefulness and comprehensiveness of the intelligence products**;
- **to strengthen the elements of prediction** embedded in the reports, so as to provide better support to the decision-making process;

- to reflect **SRI's direct experience** in certain areas of expertise and /or to enhance the **assessment angle** of information products;
- to optimize the use of the **relevant aspects resulting from the Service's external cooperation activities**;
- to identify **new potential beneficiaries with legal competences in specialized areas of expertise**, thus lending pragmatism to the reporting process;
- to submit **complex evaluative documents**, revealing – by means of multisource and cross-sector approaches – significant developments with regard to certain security threats and particularly to the implications of such threats to Romania's national security. Such reports were also submitted to local beneficiaries, in order to give them a comprehensive view of the relevant security developments falling within their purview.

In 2012, SRI submitted to **central decision-makers 4,807 reports** (**38.29%** more than in 2011), consisting of **2,468 integrated documents**.

The significant increase in the number of documents submitted to central decision-makers was mainly due to the numerous changes operated within the government. In this context, the Service focused its attention on **providing relevant information to the new beneficiaries with regard to a number of issues within their area of expertise.** To this purpose, the Service even submitted new reports on the same issues.

Apart from this approach, enhancing the degree of complexity and integration of the informative documents by focusing on major security issues remained one of the Service's priorities.

The main **national security problems** recorded in the reports were:
- economic security – **44.08%**;
- protection of constitutional values – **24.27%**;
- promotion of Romania's foreign policy goals – **21.76%**;
- organized crime and terrorism-related vulnerabilities /risks – **9.89%**.

In conjunction with the significant increase in the number of informative documents, the central decision-makers' **feedback** on SRI's analyses also increased (by **110.52%** - from 513 in 2011 to **1,080** in 2012), demonstrating the government's interest in the adequate orientation of SRI's specific activities.

The upward trend in terms of the positive feedback on the quality and timeliness of SRI's reports was also maintained (**99.06% of the total feedback,** compared to 96.3% in 2011).

With regard to the categories of central beneficiaries, the Government and the Presidential Administration are still the main beneficiaries (**66.74%** - more than in 2011 and **18.45%** - less than in 2011 respectively).

The Service's **partners in the national security system** received **10.19%** of the Service's reports, as part of a common effort to counter the risks and threats to national security and as an expression of SRI's concern for strengthening inter-institutional cooperation.

Another priority was to provide information to certain autonomous /independent organizations with regulating competences in specific /specialized fields (the capital market, the insurance market, the banking sector etc.), as well as to a number of authorities capable of taking immediate countering measures (the Court of Accounts, the Anti-Fraud Department etc.).

The number of informative documents submitted to **local beneficiaries** decreased in 2012 by approximately **23%** (totaling **2,345** analyses, out of which 1,954 were submitted to prefects and 599 to county council presidents). This trend was determined by the changes at the top of these institutions, which caused delays in SRI's reports due to the time needed by the new beneficiaries to obtain the necessary authorizations for accessing classified information.

Nevertheless, the Service has various emergency procedures and mechanisms in place for such cases, which enable it to provide information to these beneficiaries, provided that such information refers to imminent risks or threats to national security that are likely to have local manifestations.

At the same time, it should be noted that in 2012 local beneficiaries were provided with assessments on a number of relevant developments regarding the domestic and international security environment with national /European implications (e.g. terrorism), aiming at developing a security culture and acting as a warning about the possible occurrence of such manifestations in the region.

Likewise, the local beneficiaries' feedback decreased by **24.8%** compared to 2011 (when it amounted to 3,733 responses). Within the total feedback (about **99.5%**), the number of reactions confirming the usefulness and timeliness of the Service's reports is still high. This is a relevant indication of the fact that local beneficiaries value the quality and timeliness of the information provided by the Service. In fact, in **709** cases local decision-makers took action in order to remedy the situation, by carrying out inspections or enforcing sanctions.

III.2.2. Specific Preventive Measures

One of the Service's concerns was to optimize prevention mechanisms by:
  ➢ implementing unitary preventive measures with respect to the monitored security issues (some of which were reconfigured given the interconnection of the manifestations of risks or threats to national security);
  ➢ harmonizing the operational activities carried out as part of the prevention process.

In 2012, the Service implemented **3,713 preventive measures** (compared to 5,194 in 2011). The decrease in number compared to the previous year was counterbalanced by an increase in terms of potency, as well as by their unitary and practical character, with direct and visible effects on the quality of SRI's specific activity in this area of expertise.

In terms of the targeted national security issues, the preventive measures had the following distribution:

- ➢ counterespionage, support of foreign policy interests and protection of classified information – **42.23%;**
- ➢ defense of constitutional rights and values – **26.72%**;
- ➢ economic security – **15.94%**;
- ➢ identification and assessment of terrorist threats – **8.19%**;
- ➢ assessment and management of other cross-border threats – **5.76%**;
- ➢ identification and assessment of IT&C threats – **1.16%.**

The preventive measures consisted primarily **of:**
- ➢ actions aimed at prompting certain individuals to refrain from activities that are likely to generate security risks;
- ➢ recommendations to limit, interrupt or revoke the residence permit or to declare certain individuals as undesirable citizens;
- ➢ recommendations to withhold /cancel authorizations granted under certain laws;
- ➢ ensuring the security of certain institutions prone to be the target of terrorist acts;
- ➢ actions aimed at putting an end to the activities carried out in Romania by various individuals in support of terrorist organizations;
- ➢ individual training activities for self-defense against terrorist risks or against actions carried out by competing intelligence services;
- ➢ protection of certain groups of tourists (e.g. in the context of the Burgas bomb attack);
- ➢ specialized measures for the protection of classified information.

III.2.3. Notification of the Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Bodies

If the intelligence-gathering process resulted in the identification of serious offences prone to have an impact on Romania's security interests, SRI, in line with the current legal provisions, notified the competent institutions responsible for the criminal investigation and prosecution of such acts, in addition to notifying its lawful beneficiaries and taking specific preventive measures.

As part of the activities related to the notification of the local and central law enforcement bodies, the Service focused its attention on enhancing its expertise and optimizing legal certainty.

Likewise, steps were taken in order to ensure a high use value of the information products that are submitted to the institutions in charge of the criminal investigation and prosecution of a number of offenses that are likely to have a serious impact on national security.

Great emphasis was placed on enhancing the quality and consistency of the data and information submitted to the law enforcement agencies, as well as on the prompt dissemination of the information related to the perpetration of offences to the criminal prosecution bodies, so as to avoid missing out on relevant information or on opportunities to gather evidence.

Moreover, the Service's legal experts (from central or regional level) were often invited to take part in joint task groups established within certain structures of the criminal investigation and prosecution bodies.

The total number of notifications was significantly higher than in the previous year (2,689 in 2011), amounting to **3,289.**

The Public Ministry received **1,770 reports** (compared to 1,379 during the previous year):

- ➢ the Prosecutor's Office of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (PICCJ) – 25;
- ➢ the Directorate for the Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT), central unit – 160;
- ➢ the Directorate for the Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT), regional units – 413;
- ➢ the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), central unit – 418;
- ➢ the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), regional units – 442;
- ➢ the Prosecutor's Offices attached to the Courts of Appeal – 44;
- ➢ the Prosecutor's Offices attached to the Tribunals – 178;
- ➢ the Prosecutor's Offices attached to the Courts of First Instance – 90.

The Ministry of Administration and Interior received **554 notifications /reports:**

- ➢ the Anticorruption General Directorate – 66;
- ➢ the General Inspectorate of Romanian Police – 38;
- ➢ the County Police Inspectorates – 450.

In 2012 SRI continued to participate in the nationwide efforts to counter serious economic offences, by carrying out documentation activities and submitting information to the criminal investigation bodies. In this respect, as part of the **GLO** and **GLI** structures (inter-institutional working groups established in line with the National Joint Action Plan for the enforcement of the CSAT Decision no. 69/2010 *on the prevention and countering of tax evasion*), the Service submitted **1,094 reports**, out of which **965** (compared to 787 in the previous year) referred to potential elements of tax evasion-related offenses or to certain aspects prone to trigger the adoption of countering measures (inspections or other administrative measures).

III.3. Protection against Terrorist Risks and Threats

Similarly to the previous year, in 2012 there were no manifestations of either homegrown or "imported" terrorism in Romania, but the assessment of the situation revealed that the terrorist risk is currently higher.

Unlike the previous years, **the terrorist threat became more direct and explicit.** This was mainly revealed by the intentions and activities of a number of individuals and terrorist entities aimed at perpetrating terrorist attacks in Romania or support the perpetration of similar acts in Europe. Moreover, the statements of the pro-Jihad ideologist Omar Bakri have the potential to exacerbate the terrorist threat, as they drew the attention of certain Jihad groups to Romania, motivating the possible perpetration of such attacks.

Due to the efficiency of the preventive measures adopted by the Service both internally (within the National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism) and as a result of its foreign cooperation activities, it was possible to maintain the terrorist threat level (**Blue-Cautious),** as the actual terrorist threats were not imminent.

Despite the complex situation in 2012, it is difficult to estimate whether the short-term actions perpetrated by terrorist entities will go beyond the exploratory stage and will result in concrete measures against Romania's interests.

In 2012 SRI, as national authority responsible for the prevention and countering of terrorism, was able to put an end to various activities that were likely to evolve into direct terrorist threats or were aimed at supporting certain terrorist organizations.

In order to ensure the protection of Romanian citizens, institutions and interests against terrorist threats, the Service engaged into a number of **specific actions**, consisting mainly of:

➢ **preventive measures (436),** some of which had a highly offensive character.

Such measures were: declaring 15 foreigners as **undesirable** citizens (individuals who were involved in planning terrorist attacks in Romania, by disseminating radical Islamic propaganda or having connections with terrorist groups); **44 decisions to ban certain individuals from entering the country** (for individuals suspected of terrorist activities or intentions); **99 warnings** (issued for potentially terrorist threats – e.g. the Burgas bomb attack, the premiere of the movie "Innocence of Muslims"); **6 decisions to withhold /withdraw the authorizations** issued in accordance with certain special laws[1]; **other 266** specific **measures[2];**

➢ **reports submitted to the criminal investigation and prosecution bodies (23).**

The cooperation with DIICOT and with the Prosecutor's Office of the High Court of Cassation and Justice resulted in the dismantling of an illegal migration network whose members came from terror-prone regions;

➢ **protection of the diplomatic missions established in Romania** that fall within the Service's purview.

On December 13, 2012 the security staff at the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland identified and detained a **suspicious individual who intended to perpetrate a terrorist attack against British diplomats.**

Following the specific missions performed, the Service received **4 thank you letters** from representatives of the embassies where the missions had been carried out;

---

[1] *Refusal to grant Romanian citizenship, denial of the Romanian visa, withdrawal of the refugee status.*

[2] *Among which: **56** actions aimed at ensuring the security of certain institutions that are likely to be targeted by terrorist acts; **26** actions in support of the enforcement of national security-related regulations by various departments, institutions and organizations; **6** actions designed to inform and prepare the public with regard to potential threats and self-defense procedures; **37** actions for self-defense against terrorist risks.*

➤ **antiterrorist and anti-hijacking control and antiterrorist protection on civil airports**.

> The security check measures at the two international airports in Bucharest ("Henri Coandă"/AIHCB and "Aurel Vlaicu"/AIBBAV) were efficiently implemented and the potentially dangerous goods were discovered on time so that the appropriate legal actions could be enforced.

The assessments performed by European Commission experts after 3 security inspections at AIHCB and AIBBAV did not reveal any deficiencies. **The inspection committees commended the high level of compliance to the EU aviation security standards.**

➤ In 2012 the specific missions consisted of: *(1)* security checks on passengers and airport staff, luggage and cargo /postal deliveries; *(2)* security checks on the vehicles that are granted access to the CPSRA[3] and on airplanes; *(3)* executing the specific procedures in 3 cases of bomb threats on board the airplanes.
The above-mentioned activities resulted in:
   - the identification of **17 weapons** and **2,532 ammunition items** owned illegally;
   - the discovery of **73,237 forbidden items** and potentially dangerous objects for the security of flights, materials and /or substances that are subject to special requirements.

In addition to ensuring the security of the two airports, other actions were also taken: *(1)* maintaining the equipment operational within nominal technical parameters and radiologically secure; *(2)* security checks on about 20,000 Spanish football fans who came to Bucharest for the "Europa League" final (following this event, the Service received two thank you letters from the Bucharest Airports National Company);

➤ **antiterrorist protection /guard, as well as antiterrorist /counterterrorist pyrotechnic intervention**
The following actions were taken:
   - pyrotechnic interventions at various institutions (embassies, diplomatic residences, AIHCB) targeting certain suspicious objects, antiterrorist technical checks on airplanes (following bomb threats) or even examinations of envelopes suspected of containing CBRN[4] agents;
   - 599 long-term missions for pyrotechnic intervention at AIHCB and AIBBAV (35 of which were carried out during certain events attended by high officials);
   - 142 antiterrorist technical checks on institutions where high officials /dignitaries were attending certain events (mainly at the request of the Guard and Protection Service) etc.;

---

[3] *Critical Parts of Security Restricted Area.*
[4] *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear.*

> **deployment of armed sky marshals on flights**, in line with the provisions of the Prüm Convention and of the EU Council Decision 2008/615/JHA.
  To this purpose:
  - a Terrorist Risk Map was created in order to prioritize the deployment of armed sky marshals on board the airplanes;
  - the Service established cooperation protocols with partner structures on the management of the armament used by the air marshals;
  - inter-institutional activities were carried out (SRI – Ministry of Transport – CN TAROM SA) in order to modify /broaden the National Aeronautical Security Program (approved at the end of 2012);
  - final actions were taken, in cooperation with the Ministry of External Affairs, for the approval of the MoU between the Romanian and the United States Governments regarding the deployment of air marshals on board the airplanes, which was signed in Bucharest on May 3, 2010 (GD 1249 of December 12, 2012).

III.4. Prevention and Countering of Cyber Threats

The evolution of cyber-attacks in 2012 reveals that cyber threats against Romania's Critical Information Structures (CIS) are currently among **the most dynamic threats to national security**. As national authority in the field of *cyber-intelligence*, SRI took firm action and contributed (towards the end of the analyzed period) to the annihilation of one of the most powerful attacks, which targeted various institutions with foreign policy and national security responsibilities.

Such attacks reveal that **Romania is clearly targeted by hostile entities operating in cyber space** and the cyber security level of the Romanian CIS is not sufficiently high to deal with such high-intensity malicious attacks. As a result, enhancing the identification and response capacities has become more and more imperative.

At the same time, the technological developments and the trends identified in the area of cyber threats require medium and long-term **legal and procedural measures**, as well as the qualification of the workforce and the upgrading of the logistic and material supplies used by the organizations dealing with CIS.

The constant specific actions aimed at preventing and countering cyber threats that were carried out by SRI in 2012 had tangible results designed to contribute to the improvement of national cyber security. The most relevant actions of this type were:
> **the prompt notification of the institutions targeted by cyber-attacks** – the purpose of which was to access critical IT networks and to gather confidential information – and the adoption, in conjunction with the Special Communication Service (STS), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) and CERT-RO, of relevant measures in order to reestablish the proper functioning of those networks (in the case of *Red October*);
> as part of the cooperation among **SRI, DIICOT** and **FBI, 7 members of a local cyber-crime group were placed under arrest** for perpetrating numerous cyber-attacks against various American banks and financial organizations by accessing

personal data and banking information and thus causing damages estimated at approximately **240 million USD**.

➢ **the detention of 30 individuals** affiliated to an organized crime network (with ramifications in the counties of Argeş, Teleorman and Vâlcea) specialized in IT fraud, which swindled 350 persons in **USA, Canada and Great Britain**, causing damages of over **8 million USD**;

➢ the arresting of 3 members of Anonymous Romania, a group that launched, in January 2012, a series of cyber-attacks on several Romanian state structures, while they were also taking part in organizing cyber aggressive actions on entities in the United States, Czech Republic, Serbia, Poland and Brazil or in supporting the attacks orchestrated by Anonymous International on various information systems from outside Romania.

As a continuation of the above mentioned activities, our Service made constant efforts to ensure an optimal level of functioning of CYBERINT National Center which monitors/collects information on events/incidents carried out in the cyber-space and validates the proper measures needed to be adopted.

Therefore, our Center launched various projects meant to increase its technical capacities, so as to design up a system intended to take over and store data which would be conveyed to public authorities and structures that are connected to the Joint State Infrastructure of Electronic Communication as a means to identify the sources of cyber-attacks. Some of those projects are: establishing and developing a malware analysis laboratory; setting up a map that would include sources of risks to information systems; creating a documented database of risks and vulnerabilities, as well as of weapons and attack methods used in cyber-space.

In 2012, our Center cooperated with important IT&C companies, so the number of the Internet providers for which daily reports are generated increased.

Furthermore, the activity of our Center also focused on developing cyber instruments meant to support the SRI experience at the operational level in order to help the Service fulfill its specific missions.

SRI took part in and made a significant contribution to the national plan on designing an integrated system that should counteract specific cyber threats, as part of the national legal framework that should be adopted in order to regulate the specific ways and responsibilities of the state authorities in ensuring national security within the cyber-space.

As a result of the good cooperation between institutions, a national strategy for cyber security was adopted at the end of 2012, and SRI played an important role in bringing it up. This strategy also referred to a cooperation methodology for the new national cyber security system (which included the competent state authorities and institutions).

In line with its internal activities, the Service made an outstanding contribution to coordinate the institutional effort meant to ensure Romania's position and role within the cyber security strategy of the European Union.

At the same time, SRI's representatives took part in various international cooperation missions that were targeted at the exchange of best practices and expertise in the field.

III. 5. The protection of classified information

As part of its obligations as a competent authority in the field of ensuring the protection of classified information at a national, NATO and EU level, SRI carried on with its activities on the following dimensions:
- ➢ the general coordination of its activity and the control of the necessary measures for the protection of the classified information by means of:
  - providing special assistance upon the request of the legal and natural persons who are authorized to access such information (427 cases);
  - performing control activities (724) aimed to verify how the persons who have access to classified information enforce the provisions of the law, identifying the risks and vulnerabilities and adopting the legal measures needed to prevent them;

- ➢ the implementation of the specific security checks:
  - authorizing the programs targeted at preventing the leakage of the classified documents that were written (644 documents) or, as the case might be, the classified documents that were updated, filled in or modified (1060) by the entities that are granted to access the information SRI benefits from.

In the above mentioned period, the number of requests for granting the authorization to attend the programs for preventing the leakage of classified information increased by 15% in comparison with 2011:
- ➢ the granting of the authorization to access national and NATO/EU classified information to natural persons. The number of these requests increased by 43% in comparison with the last year.
- ➢ the granting of the security authorization/certificate (228 requests), the granting of the special authorizations for aero-photography, filming, laser scanning or cartography of certain national objectives and areas that have a major importance in terms of state secret security (6 cases).

As for the institutional cooperation with the designated security authorities, such as ORNISS and other institutions in the field of national security, SRI carried out the following activities related to the protection of classified information:
- ➢ provided 3193 answers to requests (mainly for the Ministry of Administration and Interior, but also for the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Special Communication Service (STS)) concerning, for the most part, natural and legal persons who had been subject to security checks in order to be granted authorization to state secret information, and to enter into contractual agreements involving such data;
- ➢ sent warnings to other competent authorities regarding the risk that its classified information might be compromised.

Comparably to the last years, SRI took part in or made a contribution to supporting official actions concerning classified information protection or related areas of activity.

As for the proper collection, transportation, distribution and protection of classified national and NATO/UE correspondence on the Romanian territory, SRI fulfilled its duties as a competent authority in the field.

It is important to underline that, in 2012, the correspondence increased in number at a central level by 3,38% in comparison with 2011 (2.581.272 documents being sent – envelopes, packages, transit folders), while the number of the beneficiaries increased by 4,48%.

At the local level, the amount of correspondence reached a number of 7.970.793 documents that were being sent (by 4,54% less that in 2011), taking into consideration that the number of the beneficiaries decreased by 0,37%.

The requests for correspondence express transportation also increased (by 40%), and the beneficiaries were mainly central public authorities and institutions that usually are entitled to express services, as well as other beneficiaries.

During the last year, the focus was redirected to the frequent activities related to the adjustment of the routes and to the transportation program – simultaneously with the actions directed at ensuring the continuous and secure functioning of the specific activities -, the changes generated, among other things, by the reorganization of the public authorities/institutions (including the specific changes of address) or by extending the network of economic agents that are authorized to classified information and including them in a national system of collection, transportation, distribution and protection of classified correspondence.

CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

IV.1. Inter-institutional cooperation

The cooperation with the other institutions in the security field was, in 2012 as well, one of the main responsibilities of SRI, as part of the common effort to preserve our national interests.

Compared to the previous years, the inter-institutional relations were defined by a pro-active approach and by a tendency to aim to value more efficiently the institutional expertise in the fields where the Service has responsibilities as a national authority or as a designated security authority. SRI focused on collecting and sending relevant intelligence on these matters to its national partners and, at the same time, in other fields that the Service has to support by providing these law enforcement structures with intelligence.

SRI acted in a consistent manner to ensure the efficient functioning of the National System for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism, the development of CYBERINT capabilities, the protection of classified information and the highest efficiency of the analysis capacities from open sources.

Concurrently, SRI took an active part in the inter-institutional activities targeted at managing important matters related to national security.

- ➢ In order to optimize of the cooperation relationships, SRI constantly concentrated on improving the partnership framework with the other law enforcement bodies and institutions, at a technical level as well, on participating in a pro-active manner in joint operations and on ensuring an operational exchange of information.
- ➢ Compared to the previous years, SRI became more involved in the inter-institutional cooperation and communication sessions, with visible outcomes related both to the benefits and the results of its participation, as well as at a quantitative level that was defined by an increase in the volume of the data and intelligence that resulted from the information exchange. This intelligence was, in fact, representative of the tangible results of a pragmatic management of the common interest aspects that mostly the experts dealt with.

In 2012, the exchange of information covered 22.642 materials, the volume of information sent by SRI increasing by 16,29% compared with 2011.

- ➢ The main cooperation relations were established with the Public Ministry, the Ministry of Administration and Interior (MAI), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), the Ministry of National Defense (MApN), the Guard and Protection Service (SPP) and the Ministry of Justice.

- ➢ The main problems that the Service dealt with were:
  - Tax evasion (in compliance with the national regulations that were issued by CSAT);

- Corruption and fraud related activities, as well as suspected money laundering practices;
- Practices and activities associated to terrorism;
- Risk factors for public order and for personal security;
- Activities associated to organized crime;
- Cross-border threats;
- Ensuring the security of diplomatic objectives/missions and the prevention of the incidents that might have an impact on the physical integrity and lives of the persons who are under protection;
- Risk factors for military security;
- The prevention of the actions that might harm constitutional values;
- Illegal activities of gathering intelligence for the benefit of other foreign entities;
- Implications on national security originating from the evolution of the international security environment.

The inter-institutional cooperation was carried out through various methods:
➢ Operational exchanges of information on different matters related to national security.

In 2012, compared to the previous year, there was a significant increase in the amount of information with the Ministry of Justice, the Public Ministry and with the Ministry of Administration and Interior;

➢ Joint activities and missions that led to complex measures within SRI structures;
➢ Security vetting and granting the authorization certificates in full compliance with the law;
➢ Notifying and reporting to the legally designated bodies;
➢ Technical and operational assistance or support in order to carry out complex missions that were initiated by other institutions in the field of national defense and security;
➢ Sharing the experience and mutually supporting the personnel during its professional training and coaching.

IV.2. International cooperation

In 2012, the Service continued to be up to its high performance standards that had been set back in 2011, a year of performances in the field of cooperation in spite of all budgetary constraints, thus managing to strengthen its position.

At the same time, the Service consolidated the relationship with its partners and witnessed an increase in the quantity and quality of the information and analysis products that were exchanged with other services or at a multilateral level (NATO, UE etc.).

The bilateral cooperation involved complex and sensitive operations, frequent exchanges of information and expertise, as well as training programs organized by or for SRI.

As for the relationship with NATO and UE, SRI strengthened its position as an important provider of crucial information aimed to support Romania's interests on major issues.

Apart from the transfer of relevant information to NATO and EU intelligence structures, the Service considered a pro-active approach in order to promote various matters that are crucial to Romania's interests (cyber security, energetic security and so on).
Concurrently, SRI constantly focused on activities involving the exchange of expertise at the institutional level as a result of its participation in various NATO and EU events, and following the notifications SRI had sent to national decision-makers.

By the end of 2012, the Service entered into several types of cooperation:
- ➢ 92 information and secret services from 64 countries;
- ➢ 29 law enforcement structures similar to SRI;
- ➢ 7 bodies with responsibilities in the field of coordination and control.

At the same time, SRI had other responsibilities as:
- ➢ a member of 6 multilateral partnership with other similar services;
- ➢ a co-partner of other security structures re-united under the membership of various international organizations and bodies (OSCE, UNO, Interpol etc.), a co-partner in different European or international cooperation entities/initiatives (International Bomb data Center Working group – IBDCWG, The global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism – GICNT, International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators – IABTI, The Proliferation Security Initiative – PSI, The Wassenaar Arrangement etc.).

New partnerships were established as a result of SRI's systematic approach of its international cooperation, and given the evolution of the cross-regional and cross-sectorial security risks. Therefore, in 2012, in accordance with CSAT decision, SRI entered into the cooperation both with one of the Middle East information services, and with the French Network and Information Security Agency – ANSSI, the French cyber-security authority.
In the above mentioned period, the total volume of messages sent and received by SRI increased by almost 20%. The number of meetings at the management level and at the level of experts taking part in international cooperation activities was similar to 2011.
All these activities were carried out with budgets that were diminished compared to the previous years, given that the budgetary restrictions led to a decrease of SRI's funds for international cooperation activities. As a consequence, the Service launched an activity prioritization program that would allow fulfilling its commitments with partners from abroad by identifying the proper solutions.

IV.2.1. Bilateral Cooperation
- ➢ SRI preserved its bilateral relations with the European and Euro-Atlantic services. As for its cooperation with certain partners from abroad, SRI's rewarding operational results – in their diversity, by their amount and value – reconfirmed its privileged position in the relationship with these services.
- ➢ At the same time, major evolutions were visible compared to the previous period in an effort to ensure a legal and operational framework based on common interests with similar services from the neighbor states (especially in order to

prevent the threats of cross-border organized crime – illegal migration, cigarette and drug trafficking, smuggling, intra-Community acquisition fictive declaration etc.). As a consequence, SRI signed border cooperation agreements and implemented new common programs aimed to ensure the interoperability of special structures.

➢ Concurrently, special attention was paid to strengthening the cooperation with the services from the extended Black Sea region or from other regions that are strategic for Romania's interests or generating security risks (Middle East and North Africa, Central and Eastern Asia etc.)

Given the evolutions of the Arab Spring, the cooperation relations with the partners in the region focused mainly on preventing the risks and threats (originating from the MENA area) at Romania's national security.

IV.2.2. Multilateral cooperation

Compared to the previous period, SRI continued to actively cooperate with NATO's specialized bodies so as to:

➢ ensure a permanent exchange of expertise on the security assessments of the NATO intelligence structures;

➢ promote national interest in the partnership with the allies, given its participation in a considerable number of NATO activities.

SRI continued to support Romania's plans to strengthen NATO's role in ensuring cyber security.

At the same time, in 2012, the Service made an important contribution to:

➢ preserving Romania's role as a major provider of intelligence for NATO since SRI's assessments were highly appreciated by its beneficiaries;

➢ strengthening OSINT's position within the Alliance.

Besides, in 2012 SRI ensured the necessary support (including the financial one) that would allow our institution to fulfill its obligations in terms of building the new NATO headquarters in Brussels.

At a national level, the Service played, in compliance with its attributes, an active role in the activities related to our partnership with NATO, such as Romania's hosting elements of the American anti-missile defense system.

At the EU level, SRI made a contribution to the Community's initiatives and requests for intelligence of the European security structures by:

➢ Promoting Romania's interests at the EU level on issues regarding the European affairs.

SRI took an active part in the inter-institutional consultations on EU issues that are related to its area of expertise and made a contribution to the national mandates the Service had been assigned with for the discussions of the working groups of the UE Council on security matters (TWP, CATS, COSI etc.), as well as of COREPER II and of

Justice and Home Affairs Council. Above all, our Service and the Ministry of Administration and Interior represent Romania within TWP.

At the same time, SRI drafted reports related to the initiatives and projects of the EU Council, of the European Commission and of the EU state members. Besides, the Service provides answers to the requests of state institutions on various issues which are debated at the level of the Community. The most part of the Service's statements were reflected in the Community's final documents, in full compliance with our national interests;

➢ Supporting the decision-making process by providing the EU representatives with an important number of strategic documents in order to strengthen the profile of the Service within the Community;

➢ Strengthening the cooperation with EUROPOL in terms of prevention and countering terrorism.

The cooperation with EUROPOL was improved by:

- Providing answers to EUROPOL's requests regarding the terrorist issue;
- Making a contribution to the drafting of the Agency's evaluative documents, especially those related to the terrorist threats to the European zone (TE-SAT);
- Sending experts to represent SRI and to present periodic reports and coordinating national inter-institutional consultations on Romania's contribution to the Agency's projects on matters related to the prevention of and countering terrorism;

➢ Supporting the Community's activities on cyber security as a national cyber-intelligence authority.

SRI played an important part in ensuring Romania's position as a partner in the European project Clean IT and organized an international conference that reunited for the first time both public authorities acting in the field of preventing and countering cyber terrorism, and private representatives of the Romanian information society.

Moreover, the Service took part in and made strategic contributions to the preliminary activities involving the Community's efforts to draft a project known as the European Cyber Security Strategy. The member states of the EU Council made the decision to convey its notification on cyber security to our Service as well.

On the other hand, given the national effort to help Romania intensify the absorption level of the European funds, SRI acted so as to:

➢ collect funds for 3 projects by correlating its efforts with other national institutions;

➢ enter into – as an associated partner or co-beneficiary – 9 cross-national projects that are collecting EU funds.

As part of the multilateral cooperation meetings between similar services, SRI made a remarkable contribution to the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), taking into account that, in 2012, the Service:

➢ took an active part in CTG's relevant initiatives and projects in order to improve its working knowledge of terrorism and adapt its action capacity to the new forms of terrorism;
➢ organized its first CTG conference (concerning the exchange of best practices on the management of terrorist risks) and get positive reactions on the event. Given the final results, SRI was designated to organize the following sessions of the conference as well.

Other multilateral cooperation events
➢ As to the Middle European Conference (MEC), SRI continued to take an active part in the event by organizing the first session of a conference on cyber security, as well as by coordinating some chapters comprised in a MEC guide of best practices on the analysis activity.
➢ In respect to the South East Europe Intelligence Conference (SEEIC), the Service cooperated with SIE in order to identify a number of measures meant to reform the Conference format, namely to align its projects with the present security challenges, as well as to the cooperation standards of other similar multilateral events.

CHAPTER V
COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF SRI'S ACTIVITIES

V.1. Strategic coordination of the activities by the National Supreme Council for Defense

The National Supreme Council for Defense, the strategic coordinator of the national security activities, adopted in 2012 – and subsequently submitted to SRI – 20 decisions that were to be enforced following the direct consultation with the Service, according to its legal competences. Besides, SRI substantiated and supported the need to enforce some of these decisions in accordance with its own assessments about the development of various security areas of activity, mainly those that the Service deals with as a designated national authority.

CSAT decisions which are related to SRI's obligations referred, among others, to:
- ➢ measures aimed to ensure a unitary process of the activity management at the level of SNPCT (The National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism), as well as measures targeted at rendering more efficient the cooperation between similar institutions. CSAT decision was adopted following the Council's analysis of SRI's report on the activity that SNPCT had carried out back in 2011 with the support of the Antiterrorist Operational Coordination Center;
- ➢ measures intended to strengthen the operational (investigative) capacity of the institutions that are part of SNPCT. The need to enforce such a norm originated in SRI's expeditious report regarding the possible implications generated by the terrorist attack from Burgas, Bulgaria (July 18, 2012). Under these circumstances, CSAT decision was meant to ensure a more rapid reaction to the terrorist threat at a national level;
- ➢ measures meant to support the implementation of IT services and systems at a national level;
- ➢ accelerating the development and optimization process (initiated since 2010) of the Integrated Information System by merging their databases so as to facilitate the exchange of information between the authorities that are part of this system.

The National Supreme Council for Defense also:
- ➢ analyzed and approved (in the first quarter of 2012) the activity of SRI in 2011 which refers to the protection of classified information related to the Council's competency areas;
- ➢ assessed and passed the register and the **maximum quantitative standards of the SRI reserves (**in the II-nd semester of 2012**)**;
- ➢ It approved the **cooperation between SRI and similar bodies and institutions abroad.**

As part of a coordinated effort made by the bodies in the National Security System to support the strategic decision making process, SRI submitted **16 reports** to CSAT in 2012 (10 of which were planned in the Activity Report and 6 were deriving from the developments in the security environment and changes of the institutional structure).
The above mentioned documents covered:

- ➢ **developments and trends in the organized crime tax evasion activities;**
- ➢ proposals aiming at the improvement of the methodology on **counterterrorist intervention planning and action.**

Moreover SRI presented **18 reports** following the requirements made by CSAT Secretariat on topics under SRI jurisdiction.

In this line we hereby mention the report on the requirements related to the norms of implementation by CSAT of Law 149/2011 approving Government Emergency Ordinance no. 75/2010 amending The **Competition Law no. 21/1996.** Specific threats to the national security deriving from the local companies' fusion, acquisition of assets or asset and liability overtake by Romanian and/or foreign entities were submitted to SRI for analysis.

According to CSAT decisions to provide grounds for strategic interest studies, SRI also contributed to the drawing up of documents by third parties.

Based on its legal liability, SRI worked on documents regarding:
- ➢ Assessments of the Risks, threats and vulnerabilities to the national security, 2013 forecasts (a document put together by the Integrated Information Office within the National Intelligence Community and delivered to CSAT by the national security counselor of the President; this document was the basis of The 2013 National Plan of Priorities in Intelligence);
- ➢ The (trimestral) assessment of the activities performed under the inter-ministerial working group (set up in 2010) on the prevention and countering of serious and generalized tax evasion.

V.2. Democratic Control

V.2.1. Parliamentary oversight

In 1012, as part of the parliamentary oversight of SRI activity, **51** documents (notifications, reports, points of view) were presented to the *Permanent Joint Oversight Commission of the Deputies Chamber and Senate,* out of which **25** were replies to specific inquiries made by the Commission.

To be mentioned as replies to specific inquiries (also presented to non-standing parliamentary commissions):
- ➢ Activity reports of the central and territorial units under parliamentary oversight in the 1st semester of 2012;
- ➢ The reply to an inquiry made by a MP on the legality of specific tapings;
- ➢ Replies to several memos presented to the Chamber of Deputies Commission against Abuse and Corruption by members of the Union of Released from Service Military on the topic of pensions restructuring.

The unsolicited information reports were on relevant security environment developments under the jurisdiction of the Service, as well as on organizational and structural changes of the institution so that the Commission would have a complete and transparent perspective on SRI.

We hereby mention as relevant the following reports:
- ➢ Periodic information reports on SRI activities;
- ➢ The information estimate on National Security Risks and Threats – 2012;
- ➢ Information report on the priorities of the institutional reform of the Service.

In 2012 the members of the Commission performed controls at the Service Units, direct consultations with the representatives of the Service meant to provide a specific control of the efficiency and legality of the activity in the local units under supervision.

At the same time, the members of the Commission continued their consultations with SRI management to clarify particular developments in the national security area.
Such is the presentation delivered by the Director of SRI of the 2011 SRI Activity Report.

V.2.2. Legality Oversight
- ➢ The entire national security practice performed by the SRI has been permanently under audit by the authorized bodies. Observing the national and the EU legislation and the legal provisions deriving from these laws, as well as protecting the rights and fundamental liberties stipulated in the national laws, in the international treaties undersigned by Romania has been under vetting in this process of constant auditing.

The auditing and control process, backed by the specialized legal department of SRI, is based on working standards and complex internal audit procedures specific to the intelligence activity.
- ➢ In its capacity as national authority in the field of IT&C interception, through the National Communications Interception Center (CNIC), SRI timely implemented the interception authorization documents. Entire activity in this area was performed under the provisions stipulated by Law 535/2004, Art. 20-22 on the prevention and countering of terrorism and by Art. 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Such activities were ensured for all the entities within the National Security System and for the Public Ministry. The internal procedure took into account the carrying out of the preventive conformity control of the authorization documents, i.e. checking if the legal requirements are met and the data is correct.

CNIC implemented throughout 2012 a total of **36,085 authorization documents for the national security system beneficiaries** (as compared to 35,678 authorization documents during the previous year, this was a 1.14% increase).
A slightly positive dynamics characterized only the **authorization of activities coordinated by the criminal prosecution bodies**, while there was a continuous national effort for countering tax evasion and organized crime, which affect the income to the consolidated state budget.

The beneficiary entities shared the number of authorization documents as follows:
- ➢ **32,680** authorization documents for the other entities within the defense system for public order and national security;
- ➢ **3,405** for **SRI** as compared to 3,418 the previous year.

The rate of warrants whose beneficiary is SRI is still low – only 9.43% of the total – and decreasing in comparison with the previous year (when it reached a total of 9.58%).

In fact, the retrospective analysis of the recent years indicates a decreasing tendency of the rate of national security warrants within the total number of legal interception authorizations (from 2008 to 2010, this rate was relatively constant between 10 and 13%), unlike the ever increasing number of authorization documents for the communication interception requested by entities other than SRI.

Regarding the data, information and material resulting from the implementation of the authorized activities for SRI, one should mention that they were used to support certain preventive measures, i.e. the notification of the competent criminal prosecution bodies.

V.2.3. Financial control
As in the previous years, the Service gave priority to the observance of the principles specific to economic and financial activities. Efforts were made to ensure the necessary budget for the optimal functioning of the Service units, i.e. budget appropriation was used according to its destination, and in a legal and efficient manner.

Simultaneously, reports and standard national evaluations were drawn up in order to give a transparent, correct and applied presentation of the Service economic and financial activity. Regularly, the resulting documentation was sent, according to the specific procedures, to the competent authorities, mainly, **the Ministry of Public Finance**.
In fact, the whole Service undergoes its own preventive financial control, together with an internal regulation mechanism, which envisages the analysis and the consolidation of the budget execution by each third-party credit administrator, on major and sector programs, and further on expense categories.

Throughout 2012, the Romanian Court of Accounts carried out external public audits at the level of the main credit administrator, as well as the level of third-party credit administrators. On the occasion of the audit at the main credit administrator, the representatives of the Court also checked, randomly, the manner of establishing and granting allowances and salaries for the staff, and the investment expenses in the case of two central units and eleven territorial units, and there were no dysfunctions noticed.

During the verifications carried out, the Romanian Court of Accounts attested the legality of the operations carried out in the administration and the use of the financial resources approved by the budget, as well as in the patrimony administration for the budgetary activities for 2011.

CHAPTER VI
THE COOPERATION WITH THE CIVIL SOCIETY

VI.1. Relations with the civil society and the security education
The efforts made in the previous years for **publicly promoting a transparent and realist image** of the role and objectives of the Service within the national security system were naturally continued in 2012, answering the public need to know with respect to the concerns of the Service.

The public diplomacy actions carried out during this period intended the improvement of the general public perception regarding the Service evolution, the capacity to manage the new security challenges, and encouraging the proactive attitude of the civil society in achieving the objectives set for this mission.

In order to support communication with the civil environment, and to promote the security culture, special attention was paid to taking advantage of the opportunities offered by various public events that one organizes or that one takes part to.

> *The promotion campaign within the high-school environment of the educational offer of SRI for 2012 had a significant impact (this included several pre-university and university programs), the seminars on "Anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism in the knowledge society", and "The Romanian Intelligence Service in the knowledge society", the activity "Career days" and the International Exhibition "Black Sea Defense and Aerospace 2012".*

Following concerns for a diversification of communication channels with citizens and the civil society, in the public area and within the media, positive signals and reactions were constantly received with respect to the SRI efforts to consolidate the security culture and the policy of institutional reform.

> *In fact, opinion polls state that SRI is among the most trusted public institutions in Romania.*

The connection to the new developments in the academic environment was a constant concern of the efforts to consolidate the security expertise, to maintain the quality and performance indicators of the research and development activity confirming the position that SRI holds as the main provider and promoter of the intelligence culture.

> *The expertise development concerns resulted, among others, in the signing of a memorandum for academic and scientific cooperation between the National Intelligence Academy "Mihai Viteazul" – ANIMV and Mercyhurst University (SUA), and the representation of The National Institute for Intelligence Studies (within the Academy) in the international master program "The 27th International Training Course in Security Policy", hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.*

The efforts to support the academic research activity and to organize and participate in specific national and international events (symposiums, academic work sessions, a.s.o.) had as purpose a more pragmatic connection to the research theme of the intelligence community, with significant benefits for promoting the Service activities.

The leadership of the Service coordinated the panel "Intelligence transformation in New Democracies" within the annual conference of International Studies Association in the USA, and the contributions of the Service representatives were appreciated.

Also, exemplifying in this sense are the workshop cycle associated to the European project for the Reduction of Cognitive Biases in Intelligence Analysis – RECOBIA (where SRI is the end-user), and the 18th Session of Academic Works of ANIMV – "Intelligence in the Knowledge Society" (with a numerous participation from the partner services).

A significant contribution to the promotion of the security culture was that of the editorial performance of specialized magazines such as "**Intelligence**" and "**Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence**" ("The Romanian Intelligence Studies Magazine"), that are appreciated both by the academic and university community, and by strategic policy makers.

In fact, "Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence" was accepted to be indexed in the international scientific data bases: "Central and Eastern European Online Library" – CEEOL and "EBSCO Publishing".

VI.2. Relations with the public and mass media

Rendering more efficient the activity of promoting institutional identity – with the purpose to increase the support granted by the Romanian population for carrying out the Service specific missions – was a major objective of SRI in 2012, and there was an obvious concern for the launching in the public area of a correct, coherent, and unitary message regarding the legal responsibilities of the Service, its place and role in the security architecture of Romania.

To this purpose, a professional communication campaign was launched, including the following:
- ➤ New visual identity elements were adopted (*logo, motto*, and institutional *branding* elements), which were promoted at public events;
- ➤ A new Service website was created, as it is an important component of the communication with the citizens, and it is continuously updated with information regarding the activities carried out, the events organized, and the publication edited by the Service;
- ➤ A commemorative monument was inaugurated to remember the antiterrorist fighters that lost their lives in the December 1989 Revolution;
- ➤ For the first time an intelligence service had a stamp issued, dedicated to the antiterrorist fight.

In 2012, there was an even more decreasing number of petitions addressed to SRI – 3,048 (51.38% less than in 2011), out of which, 46.22% were drawn up by legal persons, and the rest, by natural persons.

Special attention was paid to the requests addressed to SRI based on Law no.544/2001 regarding the free access to public information. 15 such requests were registered (their number decreased with 28.5% as compared to 2011).

There was a significant decrease in the number of interviews – 1,986, approximately 58% less than in 2011.

The main discussion points were:
- ➢ The requirement for being hired by the Service or for participating in the courses organized by ANIMV;
- ➢ Obtaining certificates and other rights;
- ➢ Drawing up claims and notifications;
- ➢ Requesting certain permits.

At the Service mailbox (relatii@sri.ro), 1,615 requests were received (11% less than in 2011). 888 answers were produced (the rest of the messages contained various offers that did not require expressing a point of view).

Although the decreasing number of claims/messages/requests addressed to SRI reveals – to a significant extent – the efficiency of the public communication in order to achieve better knowledge among the public opinion of the SRI place, role, and competence, there was still a great number of people who address the Service (both through claims, and during interviews) making requests that fall under the responsibility of other authorities or state institutions.

VI.3. Handing in the former Securitate Archives
According to the provisions of OUG no.24/2008, approved with modifications and additions through Law no.293/2008 regarding the access to one's own file and the unveiling of the Securitate, in 2012, the Service continued to hand in to CNAS the following:
- ➢ 906 declassified files;
- ➢ 300 personnel files from the non-operational fund, belonging to military personnel retired before December 31st 1965, and who are deceased. Other 1,533 personnel files are ready to be handed in.
- ➢ microfilm copies for 3 files (based on certain requests), and 1,530 microfilm rolls containing information for 87,760 files.

Moreover, 2,786 microfilm rolls are also ready to be handed in; they contain information for 170,769 files and the specific activities have begun concerning 11,415 microfilm rolls.
Notably, SRI succeeded in handing in to the Council, 99.99% of the total number of files (taken in custody in 1989) under the Law no.293/2008.

At the same time, taking into account **CNSAS requests**:
- ➢ 360 responses have been given to official notifications, most of them based on Law 221/2009 regarding the political sentences and the administrative measures

associated to them, pronounced from March 6th 1945 to December 22nd 1989, with the subsequent changes and additions;

➢ 9,296 persons were vetted.

CHAPTER VII
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

VII.1. Human resources management

VII.1.1. Human resources parameters within the Service

The implementation of major stage-by-stage objectives of the Strategic Perspective 2011-2015 "SRI in the informational era" resulted in an operational and optimal functioning of the systemic mechanisms for increased professional performance, for career support, and for motivation of excellence.

To this purpose, the priorities for 2012 were the following:
➢ Ensuring a coherent concept at the basis of the implementation process of the provisions of The Career Guide in SRI (that entered into force at the beginning of 2012), at the same time making the necessary changes;
➢ implementing the integrated career management policies by: organizing competitions/exams for occupying – on criteria of competence and mobility – certain positions and, starting career guiding and counseling processes;
➢ identifying and using uniformly certain instruments that have proved increased efficiency in the selection, testing and evaluation of human resources;
➢ Implementing alternative mechanisms for professional motivation, which should allow a judicious management of the Service resources;
➢ improving the internal communication process, meant to present and to turn to good value the new mechanisms of career management.

The structural and organizational efforts were accompanied by the constant concern to ensure the optimum human resources necessary for the Service missions.

To this purpose, according to the new strategic directions, efforts were made to identify and select certain candidates whose professional background meets the SRI needs, for the admission contests to the educational programs organized by the National Intelligence Academy "Mihai Viteazul" and by the Military Technical Academy or for direct enrollment (especially in the technical areas that imply specializations on particular fields or higher professionalism).

At the same time, the professional training focused on the development and improvement of general, specific and cross-cut abilities, according to the needs on each field of activity, while their efficiency is directly reflected by the performance indices.

From the point of view of the distribution of positions on fields of activity, the functions used in the organizing structures of the Service belong to the operational field – 71%-, and to the functional field – 29%.

The general employment level at the end of 2012 throughout the Service was of 82%, and the personnel dynamics was negative.

The average age level throughout the Service was 37 years and 9 months.

VII.1.2. Professional training

The year 2012 was a stage of institutional validation of the university and post-university programs launched in 2011, for the initiation, specialization and improvement of the intelligence officers on different fields of activity - field intelligence officers and analyst intelligence officers.

Given the general objective undertaken, to increase the training quality of the human resources, the Service focused mainly on:

➢ Developing an integrated system of continuous personnel training, with the purpose to obtain, develop, and maintain the professional abilities on different activity fields within SRI;

➢ upgrading and specializing the personnel involved in professional training activities, through participation in training programs offered by foreign counterparts or in experience exchanges with similar structures of partner services or of foreign academic entities;

➢ stimulating the research activity through: implementing two research fields – security studies and intelligence studies; extending academic and scientific cooperation with renowned higher education institutions abroad; the SRI education personnel participation in international scientific events or in events organized by Romanian higher education institutions, as well as in national and European project competitions.

In order to improve the professional capacity of the human resources, the Service went on supporting the participation of its employees in training activities organized:

➢ on a national level, by other entities from the defense, public order, and national security system or by civil education bodies, as well as by public training providers, in view of achieving abilities in fields where SRI does not hold institutional training.
SRI officers took part in training programs organized by MApN education bodies – the National Defense University "Carol I", the Military Technic Academy, and the National Defense College, and MAI – the Multifunctional Schengen Training Center, and the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.

At the same time, the Service covered the education taxes for those employees who are/were attending specialized courses in different fields of interest for the activity that is carried out; such courses are organized in civil education institutions;

➢ on an international level, by partner services or institutions/organizations competent in the field of security, in view of developing general and specific competencies for different domains of activity.

In 2012, SRI employees took part in training activities in cooperation with partner intelligence services, seminars, international conferences, exchanges of experience, and international scientific activities.

Also, at the request of certain institutions belonging to the defense, public order, and national security system – the Ministry of National Defense, the National Administration of Penitentiaries, and the Guard and Protection Service, SRI, through its own education

bodies, offered specialized training programs for attendees of the above-mentioned institutions.

VII.2. Management of financial and logistic resources
The financing of the budget expenditures of SRI was made observing the provisions of the Law regarding public finance, of the laws on state budget and on the social insurance budget for the year 2012, as well as of the legal framework modifying the respective laws, as well as the provisions specific to the national defense, public order and national security field; the financing was supported by the resource needs designed to meet the missions and objectives specific to the Service.

According to the previously established procedure, the budget allocated to the Service was distributed through the Integrated Planning System, for each third party credit administrator, on major sector programs, and on expenditure categories.

The funds allocated to units were changed throughout the execution process, following the redistribution of duties, and the need the make certain expenses that could not be precisely estimated at the beginning of the budgetary year (aids for military personnel in case of demise, covering the costs for training and professional improvement courses, a.s.o.).

Also, once a semester, at the request of third-party credit administrators, the approved indicators were updated for major/sector programs, and for expenditure categories, according to the actual financing needs identified for each unit, strictly observing the structure of the latest approved budget, on each semester, on the budget classification.

At the same time, based on OUG no.26/2012 concerning certain measures to reduce public expenses and the improvement of financial discipline, to change and complete certain legal acts, the protocol and the foreign travel expenses were reduced in the second semester of the year 2012 with 30% compared to those in the same interval of the year 2011.

According to Law no.293/2011 regarding the state budget for year 2012, SRI initially received funds amounting to 989,383 million RON. During the year 2012, budget allocations were modified as follows:

  ➢ based on HG no.754/2012 regarding the funds added to the SRI budget, which come from the Romanian Government Reserve Fund that was established in the state budget for 2012, 5,000 RON were added to the Service resources, in order to cover the necessary budgetary credits meant to support the specific activities of the national security domain;
  ➢ through OG no.13/2012 regarding the state budget for the year 2012, and certain financial measures, additional budget allocations amounting to 21,006 thousand RON were approved;
  ➢ following the MFP request, the budget allocations were supplemented with 20,814 thousand RON.

At the end of 2012, the final budget allocations amounted to 1,034,871 thousand RON (out of which, 1,021,980 thousand RON from the state budget, and 12,891 thousand RON from the Service's own income).
On expense categories, the final budget allocations were structured as follows:
- ➢ Personnel expenses – 772,592 RON;
- ➢ Goods and services – 151,938 RON;
- ➢ Transfers between public administration units – 29,801 thousand RON;
- ➢ Other transfers – 171 RON;
- ➢ Projects funded with post-integration FEN funds – 8,743 thousand RON;
- ➢ Social assistance – 5,851 thousand RON;
- ➢ Other expenses – 75 thousand RON;
- ➢ Non-financial assets – 65,700 thousand RON.

According to the Integrated Planning System, budget execution for major programs was as follows:
- ➢ information-operations – 326,028.81 thousand RON, 325,960.54 thousand RON out of which was spent (31.90% of the final budget allocations);
- ➢ technical operations – 202,424.64 thousand RON, 202,369.48 thousand RON out of which were spent (19.81%);
- ➢ financial and logistic – 229,098.27 thousand RON, 229,056.34 thousand RON was spent (22.42%);
- ➢ administration, analysis, planning, cooperation and control – 264,428.28 thousand RON, 264,373.62 thousand RON out of which was spent (25.87%).

According to Law no.294/2011 regarding the state social insurance budget for 2012, initially, SRI received funds amounting to 327,284 thousand RON. This sum was subsequently modified, supplemented with 2,929 thousand RON (through OUG no.62/2012), the final budget for the year 2012 was of 346,555 RON.

CHAPTER VIII
2013 PRIORITIES

VIII.1. Overview

In 2013, SRI will continue its actions in order to achieve its major objectives and strategic missions provided for in the Intelligence Strategy, for an optimal management and an opportune countering of risks and threats to national security stipulated in the document *The Intelligence Estimate for 2013*.

From this perspective, the Service shall take into consideration as priorities:
- The risks to economic stability, to financial balance, and to regional development, including the efforts to join and connect to a series of objectives undertaken in the EU environment, the community funds absorption;
- serious deficiencies of the central and local administration, and acts associated with widespread corruption that can affect national security;
- risk factors generated by difficulties in the modernization or in the ongoing reform process of the health, education and social protection systems;
- ensuring energy security and implementing national policies in the field;
- tax evasion as well as fiscal and customs fraud on a large scale;
- intelligence activities that are hostile/contrary to national interests of certain intelligence services, as well as certain private entities;
- cross-border threats, mainly organized crime networks, smuggling on a large scale, drug trafficking and illegal migration, CBRN proliferation, correlated with the increasing danger of local criminal groups;
- extremist manifestations regardless of their reasons, as well as other actions that can affect the ethnic and social climate;
- terrorism risks associated with the presence on the national territory of certain members and sympathizers of ethnic-separatist or Islamic groups, risks associated with the recrudescence on a European level of extremist and/or xenophobe trends of thought or ideologies that are violently expressed;
- potential national security risks generated by the security situation in Syria or in other conflict areas;
- risks and vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures (insisting on identifying and combating cyber-attacks, and other actions that can affect national IT&C systems);
- the impact of latent conflicts in countries neighboring Romania.

As far as the efforts to ensure an efficient response to new types of risks and threats to national security are concerned, one of the major challenges that the Service faces originates in the old legal framework on national security. Adopting new legislation would allow SRI to better adapt its institutional capabilities and responsibilities to the increasingly faster dynamics of the international security environment.

VIII.2. Objectives and guidelines for 2013
Throughout the Service, the following objectives (implemented on several years) and guidelines shall be taken into account; these have been established in accordance with the Strategic Perspective 2011-2015, "SRI in the informational era" and SRI intelligence Strategy.

1. **Developing the capacity to know, prevent, and counter risk factors and threats to national security, also the capacity to protect and promote Romanian values and interests, and security interests that Romania shares with its partners and allies.**

Guidelines:
- Planning intelligence collection in accordance with the priorities established in the relevant national documents, the requirements/needs of the policymakers, and the evolving operational situation;
- ensuring the analysis capacity on an operational level, and strengthening the role of intelligence analysis in supporting strategic decisions;
- reinforcing the mechanism of legal assistance and support for specific activities, which would allow more efficiency in informing/notifying the criminal prosecution bodies, the legal representation;
- developing or, if the case may be, reinforcing the institutional capacities associated with the SRI responsibilities in those fields where SRI is the national authority.

On such fields, one shall take into account:
- The prevention and combating of terrorism:
  - strengthening cooperation within SNPCT, especially with MAI, also by setting up common working groups;
  - developing the necessary capabilities of the armed attendants on board of aircrafts that fly to and from Romania, and on the national territory, as well as the capabilities necessary for carrying out the exchange of intelligence for the security of the respective aircrafts.

- Cyber-intelligence:
  - improving the activity of the CyberINT National Center, by increasing its capacity to collect events and incidents in the cyber-space.

- Classified Information Protection:
  - Ensuring the general support necessary for improving/upgrading national legislation in the field of the protection of classified information, through the relations with the National Registry Office for State Secret Information, and the Integrated Information Office within CNI.

- Transport of correspondence containing state secret and secret information:

- Ensuring the safe and efficient functioning of the system for the collection, transport, distribution, and protection of classified correspondence, in the areas under its responsibility.

➢ Implementing the Integrated IT System:
  - Ensuring the management of Romania's Integrated IT System, developing exploitation applications;
  - Strengthening integrated planning instruments, and the institutional analysis mechanisms;
  - increasing performance in the field of human resources, especially with respect to supporting and motivating professional excellence;
  - developing an integrated system for the management of human resources, thus implementing an uniform and modern method of management, leadership, analysis, logging and control of the human resources;
  - continuing the implementation of the internal control policy of SRI;
  - introducing IT capabilities for the document flows, extending the electronic support for their circulation, and for the Registry and Secretariat activities, as well as implementing electronic archiving.

2. **Setting up an integrated structure of communication and information technology, ensuring the necessary technological tools in order to increase the Service activity performance, safely and efficiently.**

Guidelines:
➢ Improving technical capabilities to process and integrate data from all sources of information, for the finding, the systematization and timely exchange of data and information;
➢ introducing IT capabilities for the flows of information and data inside the Service, associated with internal management processes; this should allow a more efficient, real time functioning of informational and decision-making circuits;
➢ Intensifying efforts to increase the technical capabilities of the National CyberINT Center, for the efficient collection and processing of events and incidents in the electronic environment.

3. **Developing and frequently using cooperation/communication opportunities in order to accomplish the SRI missions, promote national security interests and observe the Service duties.**

Guidelines:
➢ Expanding and deepening the cooperation between the Service and the bodies that are members of the national security system, and law-enforcement bodies.
  To this purpose, the main priorities are:
  - increasing the quality and timeliness of information exchanges with the other institutions;

- a stronger cooperation among experts, and organizing common actions/missions;
- mutual support in accomplishing specific tasks and technical and operational tasks;
- strengthening the technologic dimension and methods to survey and improve technical and scientific results in order to ensure support for other institutions;

➢ Active and pragmatic relationships designed to obtain directly quantifiable benefits, by a more efficient use of the existing IT tools;
➢ Improving the Service public communication activity in order to project a correct image of the Service, promoting the role that the Service has in managing the national security issues, and in the development of the security culture within the civil society at the same time with the communication within the Service.

4. **Ensuring the financial and logistic support necessary for the functioning of the Service units, according to institutional priorities**

Guidelines:
➢ Upgrading/strengthening strategies, planning instruments and analysis mechanisms in the field of the management and use of financial and material resources;
➢ ensuring the financial resources necessary for the functioning of the units, which are allocated to the fields and projects of interest to the Service;
➢ continuing the efforts to modernize and develop the building infrastructure that is property of the Service, by carrying on investment works that were started in the previous years, and initiating new investments;
➢ improving working conditions, and recovery of the work capabilities by the SRI personnel, by increasing the quality level of the logistic support, and of the services provided.
➢ ensuring transport services by car, air or sea, at the performance level required by the Service missions; increasing the performance and quality of the medical services offered through the primary medical network, in the specialized ambulatory and in the hospital, developing the activity of the clinical section, and of the academic research activities.

5. **Strengthening institutional security.**

Guidelines:
➢ estimating and managing counterintelligence risks given the dynamics of the Service activities, and the technological developments, arguing for and implementing certain integrated security policies
➢ using on a wide basis the facilities offered by the new technologies for all components of institutional security.